it to consider that its legality control over CFSP restrictive measures is not limited to annulment proceedings envisaged in Article 263(4) TFEU, but includes the possibility for it to give a preliminary ruling on their validity: ' Since the purpose of the procedure that enables the Court to give preliminary rulings is to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, in accordance with the duty assigned to the Court under Article 19(1) TEU, it would be contrary to the objectives of that provision and to the principle of effective judicial protection to adopt a strict interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, to which reference is made by Article 24(1) TEU . . . .
In those circumstances, provided that the Court has, under Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, jurisdiction ex ratione materiae to rule on the validity of European Union acts, The Court's legality control over certain CFSP acts is therefore the same as the one it exercises over other EU acts. It is an expression of its general mandate as established in Article 19 TEU; 14 it is governed by the same principles, in particular the principle of effective judicial remedies enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 15 The application of the general EU rules on legality control to the CFSP context illustrates that the Court considers the CFSP as firmly embedded in the EU legal order, despite its procedural specificity mentioned in Article 24(1) TEU. Principles and rules of general application would thus be guaranteed through judicial oversight even where applied to a CFSP situation. The latter circumstance does not entail judicial immunity. Three illustrations come to mind:
First, the Court has made clear that since international agreements in the area of CFSP are concluded on the basis of the general provisions of Article 218 TFEU, albeit subject to some specific arrangements, the Court would exercise judicial control to ensure compliance with the terms of that procedure:
16 ' [T]he obligation imposed by Article 218(10) TFEU, under which the Parliament is to be 'immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure' for negotiating and concluding international agreements, applies to any procedure for concluding an international agreement, including agreements relating exclusively to the CFSP . . . Article 218 TFEU, in order to satisfy the requirements of clarity, consistency and rationalisation, lays down a single procedure of general application concerning the 13 Rosneft (n 10). 14 negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by the European Union in all the fields of its activity, including the CFSP which, unlike other fields, is not subject to any special procedure. 17 '
The application to a CFSP situation of a TFEU-based procedure does not therefore affect the Court of Justice's jurisdiction in relation to that procedure. 18 Second, and in the same vein, the Court has considered that it would have jurisdiction to control the legality of a decision awarding a public service contract in the context of an EU CSDP Mission given that the contract concerned involved an expenditure to be allocated to the EU budget, and thereby subject to the provisions of the EU Financial Regulation. as envisaged in decision-making procedures set out in the specific CFSP chapter, if the CFSP competence is not otherwise disputed based on Article 40(1) TEU. The interpretation and implementation of the CFSP provisions (including the procedures to be followed) in these situations is left to the Council (or even to individual Member States), unless the case is framed as a violation of Article 13(2) TEU, which would arguably allow the Court's involvement. 34
Remembering their initial preference for 'intergovernmental' cooperation where CFSP is concerned, it may be understandable that Member States at the time of the negotiations intended to prevent a body of 'CFSP law' coming into being by way of judicial activism on the part of the Court of Justice, but it is less understandable that they were also reluctant to allow for judicial control of the procedural arrangements they explicitly agreed upon. That said, it is acknowledged that it may be difficult to separate procedures and content. Indeed, in Opinion 2/13, the CJEU confirmed the complexities related to the EU's submission to external judicial scrutiny. 44 In answering the question of whether the Union could join the ECHR, the Court pointed to a number of (classic) principles and conditions inherent in the nature of EU law, which in effect encapsulate the difficulties of a combination of EU law and international dispute settlement. For the purpose of the present chapter it is relevant to point to specific paragraphs in which the Court addresses the external judicial review of CFSP measures. As stated earlier, it expressed its displeasure with the idea that the ECtHR would be As will be discussed in the following section, the reason would be that 'national courts or tribunals have, and will retain, jurisdiction'. Obviously -as the EU is not (yet) a party to the ECHR -these could only be actions by the Member States. It is also clear that the ECtHR will only examine compatibility with the ECHR and cannot function as a tribunal to supervise or enforce the implementation of CFSP obligations as such. In that sense, the role of the Strasbourg Court in judicial control over CFSP is limited, although it may be confronted with questions on the interpretation and application of EU law.
In the context of the present analysis, the current role of the ECtHR is thus circumscribed to While for EU Member States this could lead to conflicting obligations under EU (CFSP) law and international law, nothing seems to stand in the way of third states using available ICJ 68 cf. the cases before the ICJ of Serbia and Montenegro (then composite republics of one single state) against eight NATO member states (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom), asking the ICJ to hold each of the respondent states responsible for international law violations stemming from the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March-April 1999. Here also, Serbia and Montenegro chose to sue a number of Member States irrespective of the fact that the actions were based on a NATO decision and also coordinated by NATO. As, according to the ICJ, Serbia and Montenegro, lacked standing, the Court did not have a chance to consider the merits of the case. The cases can be accessed through the website of the ICJ: http://www.icj-cij.org. 69 We are not aware of existing examples of CFSP Decisions taken in the framework of the Council. States as to the validity of Community acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of the community legal order and detract from the fundamental requirement of legal certainty.
The same conclusion is dictated by consideration of the necessary coherence of the system of judicial protection established by the Treaty. In that regard it must be observed that requests for 94 AG Wahl considered in the H Case that when the CJEU does not have jurisdiction it is for the national courts 'to examine the lawfulness of the contested decisions and rule on the related claim for damages' (para 89). In doing so, they may have to ask preliminary questions: '90. . . . it cannot be excluded that the competent national courts may have doubts as to the extent of their review of the contested decisions as well as on the possible consequences of that review. 91. Should that be the case, I would remind those courts that they are at liberty -and they may sometimes be obliged -to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court under Article 267 TFEU.
In that connection, the Court may still be able to assist those courts in deciding the case before them, while remaining within the boundaries established by Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU. It occurs to me that such requests for a preliminary ruling ought to be welcomed . . .'. 95 As mentioned above, the Court of Justice considered that 'the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU introduce a derogation from the rule of the general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly' (emphasis added); see at para 70 of its Mauritius judgment.
functioning of the legal order cannot in itself disqualify the only judicial protection against CFSP acts that is available under EU law as it stands. The contrary would amount to a denial of legal protection which would be equally problematic for the EU legal order, based as it is on the rule of law. Indeed, as Cremona puts it, 'this allows the Court -while granting the CFSP full scope as a policy field -to ensure that "CFSP exceptionalism" with respect to its own jurisdiction does not creep beyond its proper bounds'. 100 While one may discuss what these 'proper bounds' are, it is at least clear that the Court's general jurisdiction is not limited by the fact that a certain act was adopted in the context of the CFSP.
